Title: The Global Population Crisis: Debunking the Myth of Averted Famine
In a recent publication by Roger Pielke Jr., the commonly accepted narrative of averted global famine in the 1960s and 1970s is being challenged. Pielke presents a compelling argument, debunking the myth of a looming population crisis and highlighting the geopolitical, technological, and scientific factors that contributed to the perpetuation of this narrative.
According to Pielke, the myth of a population crisis was primarily driven by political motivations. In the aftermath of World War II, the United States was focused on containing the spread of communism and sought to improve the living conditions of people worldwide as part of their foreign policy. Additionally, domestic agricultural production had witnessed significant advancements, leading to economic strains for farmers due to plummeting crop prices.
To address these concerns, President Harry S Truman outlined a foreign aid program in 1949 that aimed to demonstrate America’s benevolence while also resolving the issue of agricultural oversupply. Food aid became an integral part of US foreign policy, with the Food for Peace program being established in 1954. This program was seen as a vital resource in preventing the spread of communism.
However, in the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson faced resistance in using the program to support India’s industrial development. In response, Johnson shifted the political justification for food aid from containing communism to addressing a population crisis caused by runaway population growth. This narrative conveniently aligned with the Cold War motivations and gained traction.
The problem was that India was not facing a famine at the time. Despite widespread poverty, there was no imminent crisis. In order to reconcile the conflicting accounts, President Johnson and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi held a meeting in 1966 where they coordinated their stories. They decided to overplay the need for food aid in the United States while avoiding a domestic panic in India.
Interestingly, this political manipulation found support from sections of the scientific community that had long embraced a Malthusian worldview. A symposium held at the US National Academy of Sciences following the Johnson-Gandhi summit warned of the supposed fate of all men if the crisis was not averted, playing into the narrative of the neo-Malthusians.
Contrary to the narrative, India did not experience a massive famine. The absence of widespread famine was primarily due to India’s increased food production and improved distribution, which preceded the widespread adoption of modern crop varieties. However, the myth of a population crisis had already taken root by this time.
The publication highlights how myths have consequences. The widely perpetuated myth of a population crisis had far-reaching effects, fueling an anti-population-growth crusade that resulted in human rights abuses worldwide. While it is increasingly acknowledged that neo-Malthusianism can cloak racist and imperialist views, elements of Malthusian thinking persist today.
In conclusion, Pielke’s work challenges the prevailing narrative of an averted global population crisis in the mid-twentieth century. By exposing the political motivations and highlighting the absence of a real crisis, he sheds light on how myths can shape public opinion and influence policy decisions. It serves as a reminder that critical evaluation of historical events and narratives is necessary for a more accurate understanding of global challenges.
