BRICS Summit Sheds Light on Russia’s Struggle for Influence Amid Enlargement Talks
The recent 15th BRICS Summit has once again brought attention to Russia’s pursuit of influence within the bloc, especially as enlargement takes center stage. However, the sudden death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, a controversial figure, diverted some of the attention away from the highly anticipated summit. Nonetheless, the prospect of enlargement remained a buzzworthy topic. Despite being a divisive issue within the bloc, an agreement was reached at the last minute to invite Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to join BRICS.
On the surface, the BRICS grouping appears formidable, accounting for approximately one-quarter of the world’s GDP and over one-third of its population. If the accession of the six new members materializes, these numbers will only increase. However, history has shown that translating these figures into real influence has been a challenge for the bloc. The initial appeal of BRICS stemmed from the rapid economic growth rates of its member countries and their increasing share of global GDP. Today, this optimism has diminished, with even China’s economic outlook being less promising than when BRICS was formed. While the bloc has developed some joint initiatives, such as the BRICS Bank (now the New Development Bank), many others have faded away after their emergence, including the BRICS undersea cable. Primarily, BRICS functions as a discussion forum without taking concrete action.
In addition to enlargement being in the spotlight, Russia’s presence at the summit also attracted attention due to its diminished influence within the bloc. BRICS holds significant importance for Russia as it aligns with its vision of a multipolar world. However, Russia itself faces struggles within BRICS, primarily due to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has rendered it toxic and unattractive. Despite attempts to seek exemption from the International Criminal Court’s warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s arrest, he did not attend the summit. Putin’s address, delivered in a peculiar voiceover, portrayed the bloc as an emerging anti-Western alliance, but this rhetoric did not find resonance from other heads of state. South African diplomats explicitly rejected the notion that BRICS is a rival to the G7.
Russia’s agenda at the summit had limited impact, with one of Putin’s primary concerns being the dollar. De-dollarization has been hailed as a groundbreaking shift, but its objectives are primarily practical. Trading in local currencies would help evade international sanctions and facilitate the purchase of Russian energy for all BRICS members. However, the prospects of achieving full de-dollarization seem elusive, as the dollar remains significantly more stable than the ruble and yuan. Russia’s goals do not align with the wishes of other members or market realities. So, what does the summit’s outcome mean for both Russia and BRICS?
The addition of six new countries to BRICS does not necessarily strengthen the bloc. Enlargement will not address the fundamental challenge of translating the collective demographics and economies of BRICS into concrete hard and soft power. Moreover, enlargement can potentially lead to further problems as the prospective new members have divergent foreign policy objectives, ranging from direct confrontation with the US to seeking long-term security commitments from Washington, as in the cases of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Since BRICS makes decisions by consensus, the already limited scope for agreement will likely narrow even further.
Furthermore, the six potential members would not bring significant benefits to Russia. None of them are major trading or investment partners for Moscow. Additionally, four out of the six countries voted in favor of condemning Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine in a United Nations Security Council resolution in March 2022. While there might be coordination of trade policies at times, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are competitors of Russia in the global oil market, vying for customers in China and India. Considering all these factors, the announced wave of BRICS enlargement seems to have more immediate benefits for Russia, particularly in the short term.
Russian foreign policy generally favors bilateral engagements where it can maximize its leverage. BRICS is primarily viewed by Russia as a means to enhance access to strategic partners, and the expanded bloc could offer new opportunities for bilateral cooperation. All six potential new members can already be considered strategic partners of Russia. While some restrictions have been imposed by Egypt and the UAE, they do not amount to sanctions. Most joining countries share a belief in multipolarity that acknowledges China’s rise as a transformative event in global politics. However, these nations may not necessarily share Russia’s messianic vision of multipolarity.
Ultimately, an enlarged BRICS lends weight to Moscow’s messaging and propaganda, reinforcing Russia’s claim of being part of a world majority standing against the West. Whether Putin’s new BRICS partners view the world in the same terms is of secondary importance to Russia’s belligerent leader. As long as BRICS continues to superficially demonstrate an alternative to the current world order, Moscow will be satisfied.
