Pakistan’s ongoing struggle to break free from a vicious cycle of military intervention in politics and the subsequent removal and replacement of prime ministers has sparked debate among democratic advocates. While many acknowledge the cycle, few offer concrete solutions beyond the obvious desire for the military establishment (ME) to stop meddling and politicians to resist becoming pawns. However, some believe that the cycle, rooted in the country’s history, can be broken if politicians learn from the playbook of Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Since Pakistan’s inception in 1947, the military has been a dominant force, given its status as the only organized institution at the time. Military intervention started with Ayub Khan’s martial law in 1958, followed by General Yahya Khan’s imposition of the second martial law in 1969. The ME began to think about indirect power control during this time, which resulted in a civil war after the 1970 elections.
When ZA Bhutto came to power, he faced a weakened ME but remained a powerful elected leader. However, during the violence of the 1977 anti-Bhutto movement, the ME was encouraged by an alliance member to intervene. This led to General Ziaul Haq’s martial law, which lasted from 1977 to 1988. The cycle gained momentum during the decade of democracy that followed, with military rule resurfacing after General Pervez Musharraf’s 1999 coup.
Although there have been no military regimes in Pakistan for the past 16 years, the ME remains politically active, resulting in tensions and the removal of three prime ministers. To break the cycle, politicians must embrace a pragmatic approach, similar to Erdogan’s in Turkey. Erdogan focused on building the economy and avoided confrontations with the military, gradually weakening its influence. His economic success and gradual reforms eventually led to a civilianization of Turkish politics.
The next prime ministers of Pakistan must adopt a similar strategy. By prioritizing the economy, treating the ME as an important stakeholder, and gaining support through economic success, they can navigate toward lasting political reforms. Eventually, economic success and non-threatening social reforms may compel the ME to accept a civilian-led government.
While breaking the cycle may take time, it is possible. Pakistan’s politicians can learn from Turkey’s example and gradually reshape the country’s political landscape. By combining economic success with pragmatic reforms, they can pave the way for a more stable and civilian-led government, reducing the influence of the military establishment on Pakistan’s democracy.
